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Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) are fast emerging as a viable means of integrating small and distributed
energy resources (DERs), like wind and solar, into the electricity supply network (Grid). VPPs are formed
via the aggregation of a large number of DERs, so that they exhibit the characteristics of a traditional
generator in terms of predictability and robustness. In this work, we promote the formation of such
“cooperative” VPPs (CVPPs) using techniques from the field of distributed Artificial Intelligence and game
theory. In particular, we design a payment mechanism that encourages DERs to join CVPPs with
increased size and visibility to the network operator. Our method is based on strictly proper scoring rules
and incentivises the provision of accurate predictions of expected electricity generation from member
DERs, which aids in the planning of the supply schedule at the Grid. We empirically evaluate our
approach using the real-world setting of 16 commercial wind farms in the UK, and we show that it
incentivises real DERs to form CVPPs, and outperforms the current state of the art payment mechanism
developed for this problem.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In recent years, a number of strands of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
research have taken up the challenge of creating smart and robust
electricity supply networks, which can make efficient use of all
available energy resources, thereby reducing dependence on
carbon-intensive conventional generators. In particular, Ramchurn
et al. [3] provide strong arguments for the role that new AI tech-
niques (the “smarts”) play in shaping the smart grid research
agenda. Kok at al [4]. discuss how intelligent techniques can be
used to integrate distributed renewable resources in existing dis-
tribution networks, while Pudjianto et al. [5] focus on the role ofinary work presented by the
onferences: AAMAS [1] and
), gehalk@intelligence.tuc.gr
), acr@cs.ox.ac.uk (A. Rogers),smart technologies in enabling Virtual Power Plants. Moreover,
mechanism design and AI techniques have been used to explore the
incentives in smart grid contexts, including in the work of Robu
et al. [6] for the coordination of electric vehicle charging, or the
work of Ma et al. [7] on incentivising reliability in demand-side
response.
One such crucial topic we explore here is the integration of
distributed renewable energy resources. While environmental
concerns are becoming increasingly important, the overriding
concern of national electricity transmission network operators
(termed the Grid herein, following the standard in the UK) remains
the reliability of supply. In particular, the Grid is responsible for
ensuring that energy demand is met without interruptions, by
dispatching power plants to produce and supply energy whenever
it is required.
Now, although reliability is easily addressed when energy is
produced solely by conventional power plants (which can be dis-
patched as required, often at short notice), the problem becomes
pressing when plants utilizing renewable energy sources are
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essentially small to medium capacity (2kW-2MW) renewable en-
ergy generatorsdhave begun to appear in greater numbers in the
network. Though their deployment could in principle reduce reli-
ance on conventional power plants significantly [5], their integra-
tion into the Grid is problematic since the DERs, given their small
size, are largely “invisible” to the Grid. This means they cannot
readily be taken into account while planning production schedules,
even if their total energy production represents a significant
amount. Even if they were visible to the Grid, the uncertainty and
intermittency of renewable energy sources inhibits individual DERs
from profitably dealing with it directly, or participating in the
wholesale electricity market because they are often unable to meet
the set generation targets. Nevertheless, as shown in a number of
existing works, the need to incorporate renewable energy re-
sources into the existing Grid is a pressing one. Specifically, the
importance of incorporating distributed energy resources has been
argued by Asmus et al. [8], who compare different approaches to
tackle this problem, especially microgrids and virtual power plants,
as well as by Ramchurn et al. [3]. Integrating renewable energy
resources also plays a crucial role in load balancing, and in this vein,
Tarroja et al. [9] discuss different metrics for evaluating the impact
of intermittent renewable generation on utility load balancing.
The approach adopted by many countries to incentivise more
renewable generation is to encourage small-scale renewable en-
ergy producers with payments according to specific feed-in tariffs
(FITs). FITs are typically set at significantly higher levels thanmarket
prices (an approach adopted in many EU countries, among others).
However, with DER numbers projected to be in the range of hun-
dreds of thousands in a single country, the use of feed-in tariffs is
increasingly seen as an unsustainable long-term policy [10].
An alternative is to aggregate individual DERs together to form
larger energy generating entities. Such entities then have the op-
portunity to become economically sustainable by overcoming the
invisibility and unreliability problems identified above. This has led
several researchers to propose the creation of Virtual Power Plants
(VPPs), which consist of large numbers of DERs, and thus have the
potential to be viewed as the virtual equivalents of conventional
power stations. The concept is extensively discussed in the work of
Pudjianto et al. [5], who distinguish between Technical Virtual
Power Plants and Commercial Virtual Power Plants, and present the
advantages of both. Our work fits into the later category, since our
focus is on a group of distributed generators selling their energy
together as a single entity. Dimeas and Hatziargyriou [11] present a
case study application of a practical VPP. Finally, Vasirani et al. [12]
consider the use of VPPs to integrate renewable generations from
wind with storage from electric vehicles. Unlike this work, how-
ever, they do not consider incentives for accurate reporting.
In more detail, in this paper, we focus our attention on the
concept of Cooperative VPPs (CVPPs). CVPPs are coalitions of indi-
vidual DERs that sell their energy jointly to the Grid/DNO as a single
coalition (and also provide a single estimate for the production of
the whole group, either as a sum of the estimates or as a joint
probability distribution). Individual DERs participating in such a
cooperative are modeled as game-theoretically “rational” agents,
which have the choice of interacting with the Grid by themselves
(independently), but choose to pool together resources and pre-
dictions with other agents because they have an incentive to do so.
Here, the CVPP itself acts as a coordinating agent, whose goal is to
incentivise collaboration and truthful/reliable behaviour from the
participating DERs. However, while the CVPP agent aims to achieve
the best total payoff for its members in dealing with the Grid, it
does not aim to make a profit for itself, beyond what is distributed
among member DERs.
Recently, Chalkiadakis et al. [1] proposed a pricing mechanismthat can be used by the Grid to promote the creation of CVPPs, and
act as an alternative payment mechanism from the Grid to feed-in
tariffs. A critical limitation of that approach, however, is that a CVPP
only presents the Grid with point (mean) estimates of its produc-
tion. Unfortunately, single point estimates do not provide any
indication of how uncertain these estimates may be and taking
them at face value runs the risk that predictions can be widely off.
An alternative that is more useful to the Grid is that, along with the
production estimates, the distribution of potential prediction errors
of these estimates is also provided, specifying the confidence indi-
vidual entities place in their estimates. This additional information
enables the Grid to optimise the scheduling of all available gener-
ators; since it would now be aware of the probability of renewables
not meeting the targets, necessitating the dispatch of conventional
generators. Depending on the confidence placed on the estimates,
the Grid is able to choose the appropriate number of conventional
generators needed on standby.
While providing accurate estimates is desirable, it comes with a
cost for individual generators (DERs). In particular, they may need
to invest in monitoring and smart metering equipment, and in
systems which can collect and analyse data from both their own
wind turbines, and also other sources such as nearby weather
stations. At the moment, since there is no incentive for DERs to
provide accurate prediction (they get paid just per unit of genera-
tion), very few will actually make this investment. Hence, there is a
real need for the right incentive mechanisms that will encourage
individual renewable investors (DERs) to make this transition, and
contribute not just to additional generation, but also to the reli-
ability of the electricity supply.
Now, scoring rules have long been used to design payment
mechanisms that incentivise agents to report private probabilistic
predictions truthfully and to the best of their forecasting abil-
itiesdvia appropriately “rewarding” agents that achieve high
scores and “punishing” them otherwise. The concept of scoring
rules was first introduced in the seminal work of Savage [13], while
Matheson and Winkler [14] first applied it to elicit continuous
probability distributions. The work of Gneiting and Rafterry [15]
provides a broad overview of scoring rule techniques, and pro-
vides a set of mathematical tools which can be used in a variety of
domains. Finally, Hersbach [16] shows how the continuous ranked
probability score (CRPS), a particular form of scoring rule which we
also use, can be used to construct ensemble predictions of weather
forecasts. However, his work does not consider the issue of
distributed energy generation and virtual power plants.
In more detail, in this work, we would like to design a mecha-
nism which can guarantee that agents will accurately declare pri-
vately calculated distributions which reflect their confidence in
their own forecast. Without such a mechanism in place, agents may
either lie about their estimates to secure higher returns or not
bother to provide the most accurate estimates. To counter such
trends, strictly proper scoring rules are used here to guarantee the
so-called incentive compatibility (or truthfulness) of the agents in
reporting their estimates [15]. This means that, for agents partici-
pating in such a mechanism, the best strategy is to declare truth-
fully the distributions reflecting the uncertainty in their
predictions. Any other strategy only results in lower returns.
Additionally, it incentivises them to provide as accurate estimates
as they possibly can.
Taking inspiration from this, we provide the first application of a
scoring rules-based mechanism in the renewable energy domain.
Specifically, we put forward a payment mechanism that uses a
strictly proper scoring rule to incentivise CVPPsdand, in turn,
DERsdto provide the Grid with their true expected production and
the true estimated probability distribution representing their
confidence (or, equivalently, expected error estimates) regarding
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are rewarded for providing estimates that are both accurate and
have a high confidence (ensuring that agents are given credit for
high probability estimates that are close to the realised ones).
Another key contribution of this paper lies in the experimental
analysis of the proposed mechanism. We base our experimental
setting on 16 real-world wind farms, distributed around the UK. For
these farms, we collect a 10-week dataset of both wind speed
predictions and actual wind speeds, for each half hourly settlement
period. We used these in conjunction with a model of the charac-
teristics of the wind turbines employed, in order to create both
predictions and measurements of the production at these sites.
Thus, our experimental conclusions are based on real data.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the formal model of our setting and the role of CVPPs. Section 3
discusses scoring rules and their properties, and presents our
payment mechanism. Section 4 details our experimental study and
Section 5 concludes.2. Energy producers and cooperatives
We consider a setting that contains several independent,
distributed energy producers (DERs) that can sell their energy
directly to the Grid or opt to join a cooperative (CVPP). The CVPP's
primary function is to represent its DER members while interacting
with the Grid: the CVPP provides the aggregate estimate of the
members' production to the Grid, receives the corresponding
payment, and distributes it amongst members in some fair manner.
The model also assumes that the day is divided into settlement
periods corresponding to electricity trading intervals (typically 48
half-hour time slots).
Formally, for any settlement period t, each DER i produces a
certain amount of energy prodi;t2ℝþ (in kWh). It can also estimate
in advance an expected production value gprodi;t2ℝþ. The method
used by a DER to compute this estimate (and its accuracy) depends
on its type of generation. For instance, DERs composed of (one or
more) wind turbinesdsuch as the ones considered in this paper's
analysisdcan estimate their gprodi;t based on an hourly wind pre-
diction obtained for their area from the UKmeteorological office (as
described in detail in Section 4).
Now, each DER can compute a relative prediction error for each
of the past settlement periods for which it has historical data over





Note that in Eq. (1), the actual production prodi;t is the random
variable to be predicted (unknown in advance), while gprodi;t is the
average prediction for this variable.
In practice, there may be wide variances because some DERs
may be able to better estimate their future production than others.
For example, DERs that use tidal energy tend to be more accurate in
estimation than those that use wind. Even among wind-based
DERs, there may be substantial differences in the accuracy of pre-
dictions, due to the age/characteristics of their turbines, or the
geographical area the DER is in. Wind may be easier to predict in
some areas than in others, because the meteorological office pro-
vides more accurate and timely predictions for some areas (as these
might be closer to existing weather monitoring stations).
Formally, Ei ¼ hei;ti, t2T denotes the vector of relative predic-
tion errors that DER i makes over some time horizon T (e.g., if the
period of study is 30 days, T contains 30  48 ¼ 1440 half-hourly
time periods). Note however that the actual production prodi;t forthe current time period t is yet unobserveddand hence the error
ei;t is not known to the producer either. If DER i is a perfect predictor,
then the vector Ei would contain only zeros; however, in practice, it
will always contain a number of negative values (over-prediction)
and/or positive values (under-prediction). If DER i corresponds to
an unbiased predictor (i.e., one which neither systematically over-
predicts or under-predicts), then we could expect the values in Ei
to have a mean of zero and follow a normal distribution
N ðm ¼ 0; s2i Þ. In practice, however, one cannot assume that the
predictions can be always approximated as a normal distribution,
or that they are always unbiased. In this paper, we develop a novel
method for constructing the distribution empirically, without
requiring any normality assumption.
Note that the above definitions can be naturally extended to a
CVPP, in which a number of DERs sell their production jointly, and
make a joint prediction. Formally, the actual and estimated pro-
duction of a cooperative C at t are denoted by prodC;t and gprodC;t
respectively. If I denotes the set of the participating CVPP members,
the total CVPP production at t can be computed as the sum total of
its members' production, i.e. prodC;t ¼
P
i2I
prodi;t . Similarly, the es-
timate of the CVPPs production at time t is the sum of the estimates
of the individual DERs at time t, i.e. gprodC;t ¼ P
i2I
gprodi;t . The vector
EC ¼ heC;ti is defined in the same way as in the case of a DER.
3. The payment mechanism
In order to reward agents for accurate reports of their uncer-
tainty, we design a payment mechanism which employs scoring
rules. A scoring rule is a real-valued function SðbF ; xÞ, specifying the
reward that a forecaster agent i should receive if it reports a pre-
dicted distribution bF over the probability of some future event, and
the event x occurs (in our case, x2ℝ).
Scoring rules with certain properties can be of significant value
to a mechanism designer. In particular, strict propriety is one such
important property [15,13].
Definition 1. A scoring rule SðbF ; xÞ rewarding a prediction with
distribution bF and realisation x, is called strictly proper if it incenti-
vises a truthful report, meaning reporting the true distribution F is the
only report that maximizes expected reward. Formally stated, if F is the
true underlying distribution of the random variable x, scoring rule S is
strictly proper if SðF; xÞ  SðbF ; xÞ, with the equality holding if and only
if bF ¼ F.
While in this paper we use strict propriety, similarly, a scoring
rule is said to be proper if SðF; xÞ  SðbF ; xÞ, but the prediction bF ¼ F
is not necessarily the only one that maximizes SðbF ; xÞ. In our case,
the use of a strictly proper scoring rule has a specific interpretation:
it means that energy suppliers can expect to maximize their pay-
ments if and only if they accurately report their expectation over the
prediction error they can potentially make. Here, the distribution F
is constructed from the vector of past prediction errors Ei, while
observation x is the current observed error ei;t. The reason why
strict propriety is such a desirable property in our CVPP context is
that we assume that member DERs are rational agents, that maxi-
mize their own expected utility. Hence, if they would receive a
higher utility from reporting different than truthfully, this could
potentially break the accuracy of the joint CVPP prediction and
payment received by the CVPP from the Grid, and hurt everyone in
the coalition.
3.1. Continuous ranked probability score
Many of the proper and strictly proper scoring rules proposed in
existing literature [13] do not satisfy the requirements of our
application, because they are not sensitive to distancedi.e., no credit
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values that are close, but not identical, to the realised value. This is a
necessary requirement for us, because being far off the predicted
production amount is much more detrimental than being only
slightly off. However, these desirable characteristics are possessed
by the Continuous Ranked Probability Score (CRPS) [14], which is a
strictly proper scoring rule used for continuous variables. This
particular scoring rule has lately attracted renewed interest in the
scoring rules literature, and has been used to quantify weather
predictions [16] (such as wind speeds, tides or solar intensity)
which are essential for renewable generation as well. We have
therefore chosen this rule as the basis of our payment mechanism.
Formally, CRPS is defined as (c.f. [15], Eq. (2)):
CRPSðF; xÞ ¼ 
Z∞
∞
ðFðyÞ  1fy  xgÞ2dy (2)
where F is the reported underlying distribution of a random vari-
able, and x is the actual observation of this variable, for the instance
when the CRPS score is computed. Moreover, here the function
1fy  xg is an indicator function, which takes the value of 1 if the
expression in the brackets (y  x in this case) is true, and 0 other-
wise. The following lemma is essentially a result from Gneiting and
Rafterry [15] (Section. 4.2, Eq. (2)), which we'll make use in sub-
sequent proofs in this paper.
Lemma 1. (c.f. [15]). The CRPS rule as defined in Eq. (2) is strictly
proper.
Moreover, we note the CRPS score, as defined in Eq. (2) is always










CDF of relative prediction errors over 10−week period
Perfect predictor
Shooter’s Bottom
Lynch Knoll3.2. Constructing the expected error probability distribution
Consider the vector of historical observations
incrðhei;jiÞ; j ¼ 1…N, where ej;i are defined as in Eq. (1) above, while
incr is an operator that orders the vector of values in ascending
order. Here, we consider the prediction error of DER i as a random
variable drawn from some unknown distribution Ei, for which the ei
values are prior observations.1 Now, we construct the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of this variable as follows. We consider
the sequence of steps between each pair of ei,j and ei,jþ1 observa-
tions ordered in terms of value in an increasing order on the X-axis,
and an equal distancing on the Y-axis of the respective probability
density function (as, in the absence of other prior information, all
observations are assigned an equal 1N probability). So, for example, if
the error vector contains N ¼ 3360 half-hourly observations (as is
the case for the real-world dataset used in this paper), the CDF Ei
will be formed by 3360 small “steps”, where some of these may be
vertical (e.g., if the error vector contains many zeros, implying
many instances of perfect prediction, those steps will be vertical).
Note that the actual time step at which each error observation was
made is not relevant here: the observation values are simply placed
in the vector in an increasing order fashion, irrespective of the time
step they correspond to. An illustration of this process is provided
in Fig. 1 for three cases: a theoretical optimal predictor (for which
the CDF is a perfect step function, with all probability mass at 0), a
good predictor wind farm (i.e. the CDF close to the step function)
and a poor predictor, chosen from our dataset.1 To avoid introducing additional notation, we slightly overload the notation Ei to
refer to both the vector of past prediction errors, and the empirical distribution
constructed directly from it. For the remainder of this paper, Ei refers to the ex-
pected distribution.Note that an alternative to this process would be to assume the
distribution Ei must follow a normal distribution, and try to fit a
sigmoid shape, symmetric w.r.t. the origin, through the empirical
data points. However, the method we are proposing above is much
more generic, and does not require any assumptions about the Ei
distribution that the errors must follow. In fact, several of the dis-
tributions observed empirically (as seen in Fig. 3) are not sym-
metric, and deviate significantly from a normaldbut our method
can readily handle this fact.
Now, given the expected error Ei distribution empirically con-
structed as above, the CRPS score, defined in Eq. (2), can be actually
computed as follows. Let x be the (yet unseen) error observation.
Consider the empirically constructed prediction error vector
incrðhei;jiÞ; j ¼ 1…N earlier introduced, containing N values in an
ascending order; and let posðxÞ be the position of value x if inserted
in that vector (that is, x ¼ ei;posðxÞ). The value Ei(x) is then the CDF of
the observation x, given distribution Ei (i.e. the probability that the
random variable will be smaller than x): EiðxÞ ¼ posðxÞN , as observa-
tions have equal prior probability. Given this, the CRPS from Eq. (2)
can be calculated as:
CRPSðEi; xÞ ¼ 
X
k¼1































Intuitively, Eq. (3) expresses the integral in Eq. (2) as a discrete
sum over the “step” intervals of the CDF function Ei on the X-axis.
On the Y-axis, the squared distance to either 0 or 1 is taken,
depending on the value of the indicator function following Eq. (2).−100 −50 0 50 100
0
Deviation of actual output from predicted amount (%)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the empirical distribution Ei constructed from real error data for 3
DERs: 1. A theoretical optimal predictor, 2. A good predictor wind farm (Shooter's
Bottom), 3. A poor predictor wind farm (Lynch Knoll).












Score if prediction errors are normally distributed N(0,σi)













Fig. 2. Illustration of accuracy factor S i;t assuming past prediction errors of DER i
follow a perfect normal distribution N(0,si).












CDF of relative prediction errors over a 10−week period
Deviation between actual output and prediction (%)
Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution functions of the prediction errors for the 16 wind farms
over the 3360 half-hourly time points (10 weeks), when prediction is requested 4 h in
advance.
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The form of the CRPS function in both Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) above is
scaled to take negative values, with a maximum of 0 (if the agent is
always a perfect predictor). To be useful in the payment functions,
we need a score scaled in the interval [0,1], with amaximumof 1 for





1 CRPSEi; ei;t (4)
Note that, for ease of notation, we will denote the score of DER i
at time t as S i;t ¼ S ðEi; ei;tÞ, where x¼ei,t is the new observation at
time t predicted by Ei. Also, note the same scoring equations can be
applied to a CVPP C of DERs which sell energy jointly, by replacing
the index i with C.
Lemma 2. The accuracy score S defined in Eq. (4) above is strictly
proper.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Denoting by Ei the truthful
report, assume there exists another report dEi;EisE

i such that




1 CRPSEi ; ei;t
By definition (Eqs. (2) and (3)), CRPS is always a negative value
(with a max at 0). Hence we can multiply both sides with
ð1 CRPSðEi; ei;tÞð1 CRPSðEi ; ei;tÞ, yielding:
1 CRPSEi; ei;t<1 CRPSEi ; ei;t
This means dEi; s:t: CRPSðEi; ei;tÞ>CRPSðEi ; ei;tÞ. This is a direct
contradiction with the fact that CRPS is strictly proper (Lemma
1).,
Fig. 2 illustrates the accuracy score in Eq. (3), assuming that the
expected error distribution Ei of a DER i follows a perfectly sym-
metric, normal distribution centered at zero: Ei ¼ Nðmi ¼ 0; siÞ. In
this particular case, as shown in Ref. [15], Eq. (2) reduces to a
function that depends only on ei,t and si (again, note that the CRPS
form we use in this paper also allows us to work with historical
prediction errors that do not follow such normality). However, it is
interesting to observe here how this error varies for different values
of reported standard deviation si. If DER i is highly confident in its
predictions (reporting si ¼ 0), the maximum reward for accuracy
can be achieved, but only if the actual error is also close to 0.
However, if the actual relative error is high, then being truthful, by
reporting a higher si (i.e. less confidence), provides a better reward.
This is the essential property of scoring rules: reporting truthfully
the past distribution of prediction errors is always the agent's best
available strategy.3.4. Payment from the grid to individual producers or CVPP
We now present our payment mechanism. We first define the
“Grid-to-CVPP” pricing function providing payments for the energy
supplied by a CVPP to the Grid (or, in fact, any DER i that chooses to
sell directly to the Grid). We then present the “CVPP-to-DER”
redistribution function, used by the CVPP to distribute the received
payments among its members internally.
First, we denote the electricity base price per kWh produced by
pB. This is a price paid per kWh of electricity produced, regardless2 For example www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/domestic/content/feed-tariff-
scheme.of the predictability of the producing DER (as used by most feed-in
tariff schemes2). Denoting by prodi;t the production of i at time slot
t, and by S i;t the accuracy score (as defined in Eq. (4) above), the
payment from the Grid to DER i is then:
pG;it ¼ prodi;t  pB  S i;t (5)
The same payment function applies from the Grid to a CVPP
indexed by C (if a group of DERs sell energy together making a joint
prediction), by simply replacing index i with C. Essentially, since
S i;t2½0;1, the price per unit pB  S i;t paid to DER i is a fraction of
the baseline price pB, based on the accuracy. Moreover, this pay-
ment rule incentivises individual DERs to submit truthful produc-
tion estimates, as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. The payment rule p defined in Eq. (5) is strictly proper.





t ðEiÞ>pG;it ðEi Þ. This means:
dEi; s:t: prodi;t$pB$S i;tðEi; ei;tÞ>prodi;t$pB$S i;tðEi ; ei;tÞ However,
the unit price pB is a positive constant and prodi;t is the observed
production (not dependent on the report Ei) and also positive.
Hence, this means: dEi; s:t: S i;tðEi; ei;tÞ>S i;tðEi ; ei;tÞ, which is a
direct contradiction with Lemma 2.,
This proof can also be stated that the payment function p is an
affine transformation of the score S i;t , and hence boasts of the
same strict propriety properties (c.f. [15]). As shown in the next
section, for the redistribution function inside a CVPP this no longer
holds and an additional step is needed.
The key intuition of having a reward based on a strictly proper
scoring rule is that the reporting DER not only has an incentive to be
as accurate as possible (thus report a prediction gprodC;t as close to
prodC;t as possible), but also to be truthful about the entire past
prediction distribution Ei. Although, in this way, an imprecise agent
that declares less than full confidence (i.e. through the distribution
of its prediction error) will not receive the maximum score, and
hence reward, even if its current prediction turns out to be
completely accurate, on the other hand, if the prediction turns out
to be poor, it will get penalised much less, because it declared this
possibility through the distribution vector of prediction errors.3 www.ecotricity.com.3.5. Payment mechanism within CVPP
If a set of DERs decide to join together in a virtual power plant C,
this CVPP will first aggregate all their reports, past data, and pro-
duction estimates, as discussed in Section 2; and will then get
rewarded by the Grid with payment pG;Ct for each period t. This
payment is then distributed by the CVPP to each member i2I
(where I is the set of members) as:
pC;it ¼
prodi;t  S i;t
prodi;t þ
P
jsiprodj;t  S j;t
pG;Ct (6)
Eq. (6) ensures each member is paid a weighted fraction of the
total payment received by the CVPP in period t, with a weight
proportional to both its actual energy output prodi;t and its indi-
vidual accuracy score. The normalisation is such as to allow us to
have the following property:
Lemma 4. Given a set of reports from other agents Ej,j s i, the
redistribution payment pC;it in Eq. (6) is maximised when agent i is
truthful.
Proof. For the proof, we first observe that the factor in Eq. (6) that
depends on the report Ei of agent i is the score S i;t (the measured
output prodi;t is not a report). Moreover, note that the maximum
value that the accuracy score can take (for a perfect prediction) is
S i;t ¼ 1 (this can be seen from Section 3.3, as S i;t takes a value of 1
when CRPSðEi; ei;tÞ takes the maximum value of 0). Now, a natural




S j;t as a normalisation factor. However, this would not be an affine
transformation, because the factor S i;t (depending on report Ei)
cannot appear both above and below the fraction. Essentially, what
we do here is that in the denominator, for each agent i, we replace
S i;t with its theoretically maximum possible value of 1. This “sum
of others plus max” mechanism ensures that S i;t only appears
once, above the line.





t ðEiÞ>pC;it ðEi Þ. The equation of pC;i
consists of two parts: the fraction and pG;C . Let us focus on pG;C first.
This factor partially depends on the report Ei of agent i. Given a setof reports by the rest of the agents, the best strategy for agent i in
order to maximize pG;C is to also try to be as accurate as possible
with its own accuracy report Ei . Let us assume, however, that i
chooses not to maximize pG;C , by reporting EisE

i . Then, the only
way for i to benefit from this report is if the first pC;it factor in Eq. (6)
is such that pC;it ðEiÞ>pC;it ðEi Þ. But S i;t is the only factor that de-
pends on Ei in this first part. Thus, this necessitates that
dEi; s:t: S i;tðEi; ei;tÞ>S i;tðEi ; ei;tÞ, a contradictionwith Lemma 2.,
Note that while the total amount redistribution by the coopera-
tive to the agents in Eq. (6) is guaranteed to be below the total
payment pG;Ct received by the cooperative from the grid operator, not
the entire amount can be redistributed. This is because in the de-







Hence, there will be a small amount that cannot be distributed, that
will be kept by themechanismdesign (e.g. by the energy cooperative
towards its running costs) - however, in practice for a large number
of agents, the non-redistributed amount will be very small (as we
show experimentally in Section 4.5).
4. Experimental analysis
We study the performance of the proposed pricing functions in a
real-life, renewable electricity generation scenario. Specifically, we
consider the setting of Ecotricity, one of the largest renewable
generation and distribution companies in the UK3. Ecotricity owns
16 wind farms distributed across the UK, with installed nominal
capacities ranging from 0.5 MW to 16 MW. These farms differ not
only in their nominal capacities, but also by the amount of wind
they receive at their geographical locations and, crucially, their
ability to use good wind speed predictions in those areas.
The overall question we consider in these experiments is: If
these farms were independent producers working with the Grid,
would the pricing functions we propose incentivise them to
cooperate by forming a CVPP? Moreover, we aim to compare the
incentives offered by the proposed scoring rules-based payment
function (in which DERs report a full probability distribution)
against a benchmark payment function in which the agents report
just a single-point estimate of their future production.
4.1. Real-world data collection
Both the actual and predicted electricity generation for each
wind farm, for each half hourly settlement period, depends pri-
marily on the wind speeds. For our experiments, we collected half-
hourly wind speed data for a 10-week period from 15 February to
30 April 2011. The data was collected from the website uk.weather.
com, which essentially records the latest predictions made avail-
able by the UK Met Office. Both the actual and predicted wind data
for each half hour were collected using the geographical locations
of the 16 wind farms of Ecotricity. For each data point, we consider
different prediction horizons, ranging from 1 to 24 h.
Given the predicted and actual wind speeds for any given time,
the predicted and actual energy produced depends on the so-called
power curve of each turbine. Power curves follow a sigmoid shape
function [17]. At lowwind speeds, the power generated is low, then
it increases rapidly as wind speed increases and it levels off for high
wind speeds. Note that wind turbines also have a safe operating
limit for the wind speed they can use, above which the turbine
temporarily shuts down to protect itself from damage. However,
such high speeds were not recorded in the data set we used, so this
does not influence our results. Formally, the energy generated by
producer i at period t is:







where NomCapacityi is the nominal capacity of farm i, wHHt rep-
resents the wind at the hub height at time t and e is Euler's
number. The nominal (or installed) capacity is the maximum en-
ergy that a wind turbine can produce, under ideal wind conditions.
In our case, each of the 16 Ecotricity farms has a different nominal
capacity, ranging from 0.5 MW to 16 MW. The hub height wHHt is a
parameter of the wind turbines and, likewise, it differs for each
farm (as larger turbines have higher hubs). The method of
computing the wind speed at the hub height, given the data (and









Here, in the original wind data (i.e. the wt parameter) is
expressed in km/h, heighthub is taken from the data available for
each Ecotricity location, while 0.2 is the so-called shear exponent
used in vertical wind potential calculations [18]. In order to set the
power curve parameters a and b, we use a technical report from
Enercon (the main producer of the wind turbines used by Ecotricity
farms) [17], based onwhich we set the values a¼ 0.625 and b¼ 9.7.
The above power curve function was used for generating both the
actual and predicted energy production values for each of the 16
wind farms and each of the 70 days 48 periods¼ 3360 half hourly
periods. For each period, the predicted output was computed and
logged for 24 prediction horizons: 1e24 h in advance.4
In terms of summary statistics, the installed (nominal) capacity
of the 16 wind farms ranged from a minimum of 0.5 MW installed
power output to a maximum of 16 MW, with newer wind farms
being able to provide considerable more power. The average hub
height ranged from 42 m to 85 m, again due to newer wind turbine
types operating at considerably higher hub heights. Finally, in
terms of prediction accuracy, the standard deviation s of the esti-
mates over the 3360 datapoints for a prediction time horizon of 4 h
(used in the first set of our experiments) ranged from aminimum of
s ¼ 0.3271 for the best predictor, to a maximum of s ¼ 2.45 for the
worst predicting plant. While wind forecasting is known to be a
very difficult problem, there is clearly quite a lot of variance in how
well Ecotricity plants are able to predict generation, both due to the
equipment they have installed, but also proximity to weather
stations.
For the fixed price parameter pB in Eq. (5) we assign pB ¼ 0:8.
This value enables a realistic comparison, since the average amount
paid per kWh in this setting matches the range of the feed-in tariffs
currently being offered for renewable wind generation by the UK
government (see www.fitariffs.co.uk/eligible/levels/). But, unlike
our payment functions, feed-in tariffs do not reward prediction
accuracy, nor do they incentivise formation of CVPPs.
Fig. 3 shows the cumulative distributions (CDFs) of the errors Ei
of the 16 DERs over the 3360 half hourly periods, if the prediction
occurs 4 h in advance. In this representation, the CDF of a perfect
predictor would be a step function (i.e. the CDF for any value <0 is 0,
and for any value >0 is 1); while, had errors been following a
normal distribution, it would have been a sigmoid function.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, however, the real distributions of the 164 Note that, in real-life, there may be other factors causing a variation in the
actual power being produced, besides those captured in Eq. (7)de.g., losses in
transformers and transmission lines, from frequency matching, etc. However, these
can be expected to be insignificant, and thus do not alter our conclusions.farms considered here do not follow perfect normal distributions
(in fact, they are often non-symmetric), with CDFs ranging from
those closer to a step function, to one corresponding to a more flat,
uniform distribution. Our method can handle these variations, as
the CRPS score in Eqs (2) and (3) is computed empirically by inte-
gration, and is proportional to the area between this curve and a
vertical line corresponding to the actual observation.4.2. Experimental setup
For our experimental analysis, we compare 4 different genera-
tion scenarios. They are as follows.
(1) All the 16 sites (or DERs) interact with the Grid as single,
independent producers (i.e. as singletons) and are asked to
provide only a single-point production estimate.
(2) All the 16 DERs interact with the Grid as singletons, but
provide the Grid with both a production estimate and the
expected distribution of their relative prediction errors.
(3) The 16 DERs interact with the Grid grouped together in a
CVPP, and are only asked to jointly provide one CVPP-wide
single-point production estimate.
(4) The 16 DERs interact with the Grid grouped together in a
CVPP as above, but jointly provide the Grid with both a CVPP-
wide production estimate, and the expected distribution of
their global prediction error. In the two cases (i.e., scenarios 2
and 4) when the DERs, and respectively the CVPP, provide
both expected production and distribution of relative pre-
diction error (which is given by their vector of historical
prediction errors up to that point), they will be paid ac-
cording to the function in Eq. (5). In the other two cases (i.e.,
scenarios 1 and 3) when the DERs (and respectively, the CVPP
formed by them) only provide single point estimates, they
will be paid according to the pricing function proposed in










Here prodC and pB represent the actual production and the base
price per kWh respectively, and have the same meaning as in our
Eq. (5). However, in the point-based estimate payment function
from Eq. (8), agents report only a single point estimate gprodC , and
not the entire distribution Ei of the relative error they expect to
make.
To ensure a fair comparison between the two methods, the a
and b parameters of the payment function in Eq. (8) are scaled such
that, when the DERs participate in the market as singleton pro-
ducers, they receive roughly the same payment with both the
payment functions (i.e. the ones in Eqs. (6) and (8)). In this way, we
have an unbiased benchmark for comparing the effects of these
functions towards incentivising the formation of a CVPP.4.3. Results for a single prediction horizon
First, we considered a setting in which all the DERs are asked to
predict their productions 4 h in advance. This prediction horizon is
often used in energy markets for short-term wind energy pre-
dictions [19], and provides a good benchmark value for our model.
Results for this setting are shown in Fig. 4. The 16 DERs are ordered
from poor predictors (high standard deviation, i.e., s) to good
predictors (low s). The prediction error Ei of each farm or DER was
computed using all the data from the 3360 half hourly intervals in
our 10 week dataset. Results were tested for statistical significance
V. Robu et al. / Energy 117 (2016) 19e2826using a paired t-test and were found significant at the p ¼ 0.05
level.
Now, looking at the results in Fig. 4, two main trends can be
observed. First, it is seen that, when DERs are interacting with the
Grid as singleton producers and their estimates are reasonably
accurate, they receive very similar payments under both payment
mechanisms. This is expected because of our choice of parameters
for the point estimates-based payment function in Eq. (8). The
second observation is that, for both types of payment functions,
forming a CVPP is clearly beneficial for all the agents.
The key reason why cooperative action is beneficial is the un-
certainty reduction effect of adding together a number of uncer-
tainty distributions from different DERs. When a number of DERs
report a single aggregate estimate of joint generation, rather than
individual ones, their under- and over-estimate prediction errors
often partially compensate each other. This results in a much more
accurate joint estimate e and hence in a larger payment than the
sum of payments they would have received as singletons. In Figs. 4
and 5, this is reported as a payment per unit of energy generated, in
order to level out the fact that wind farms in our setting have
different sizes (as discussed before, installed nominal capacities of
DERs range from 0.5 MW to 16 MW). Here, the revenue per unit of
generation provides an accurate metric for the benefits of grouping
DERs into a CVPP to improve accuracy. Moreover, note that while
good predictors (those at the right hand side of the axis in Fig. 4)
received comparably more benefit of being in the CVPP due to our
distribution function, poor predictors also receive more revenue by
participating in the CVPP, rather than accessing the market as
singletons. Essentially, collective action is incentivised from all
agents, as the penalty from poor prediction is compensated by the
improved joint accuracy from being in the CVPP.
Finally, we note the incentive to form a CVPP is considerably
stronger with CRPS payments (where agents report both a pre-
dicted mean and an error), than with single-point estimate pay-
ments. Intuitively, the reason for this is that, with a scoring rule-
based payment function, the CVPP is “punished” less for poor
predictions when it also reports the confidence in these predictions
(in the form of the expected distribution of the relative prediction





























In CVPP, CRPS payments
In CVPP, point estimates 
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Fig. 4. Average payment made to each individual farm (DER) for the 10 week period
(in £/kWh), for the setting where all DERs are asked to predict their production 4 h in
advance. DERs are ordered ascendingly, in the order of their prediction accuracy (from
the poorest to the best predictor).scoring rules payment mechanism results in both gathering more
useful information for the Grid (in the form of expected error dis-
tributions), and in providing stronger incentives for individual
DERs to group together into cooperatives.
4.4. Results for different prediction horizons
Next, we also investigate whether the incentives for forming
CVPPs, and the advantages of our scoring rules-based payments
mechanism over the point estimate payments hold true over
different prediction horizons. To this end, the number of hours in
advance that the agents are asked to predict their productions is
varied from 1 to 24 h. Moreover, in contrast to the previous section,
we look at the aggregate revenue, averaged over all the DERs, rather
than individual DER revenues; this allows us to summarize each
setting of the prediction-time horizon in a single value. The results
and standard error over the different time points are shown in
Fig. 5. As in Section 4.3, for the scenarios when DERs interact with
the Grid as singletons, they receive a similar per-unit payment (in
£/kWh) under the scoring rule-based and point estimates-based
mechanisms. Results were found to be statistically significant us-
ing paired t-tests.
We note that the incentive for collective action (joining the
CVPP) remains strong as in Fig. 5(a), the revenue per unit generated
in the two scenarios where agents interact in the market through
the CVPP clearly dominate the revenue in the singleton settings.
Interestingly, the effect becomes stronger as the forecasting hori-
zon (i.e. the number of hours in advance the prediction is reques-
ted) increases. This is because the variance of the prediction for all
agents (both good and poor agents) decreases with the longer time
horizon, hence they get more benefit by forming a CVPP. Moreover,
this evaluation also shows that, for all prediction horizons, our
mechanism performs much better in incentivising producers to
form CVPPs than point-based estimates payments. It is especially
noteworthy, however, that the relative advantage offered by the
scoring rule-based mechanisms over the single-estimate mecha-
nisms actually increases considerably as agents are required to
predict within a longer prediction horizon (i.e., more hours in
advance). In Fig. 5(a), this advantage ranges from 7.3p/kWh vs. 7p/
kWh for 1-h in advance predictions (a difference of approx. 4%), to
£0.67 vs. £0.57 for 24 h in advance (a difference of approx. 17%). The
underlying reason for this is that, as predictions are attempted
further in advance they become considerably less accurate (i.e. they
are made with a higher expected relative prediction error). The
scoring rule-based mechanism allows the CVPP to truthfully report
this expected loss of accuracy (by reporting a worse distribution of
expected relative errors), and hence get “punished” less.
Fig. 5(b) plots the same effect in percentage (relative) terms of
the increase in per-unit payment. Note that singleton agents do not
benefit so much from the CRPS-based scheme (though there is a
slight positive difference of about 1%), because their accuracy is too
low to benefit anyway. However, grouping in a CVPP allows them to
report their increasing joint uncertainty, and thus gain up to 17%
more per-unit payment under the CRPS-based scheme compared to
the single-point estimate scheme.
4.5. Non-redistributed payments
Finally, one aspect we studied in our experiments is how large
are the payments collected by the CVPP that remain undistributed
from the CVPP to individual members, due to our redistribution
mechanism. Recall that Eq. (6) assures that redistribution payment
function guarantees truthful reports of expected generation, but a
small part of the paymentmay remain undistributed by the CVPP to
individual DERs. In particular, Fig. 6 shows the size of this payment
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% increaase in CVPP payment
% increase in singleton payments
Fig. 5. (a) Average revenue across all DERs (in £/kWh), for different prediction horizons ranging from 1 to 24 h. (b) Percentage increase in average (i.e. per kWh) revenue of the
scoring rules-based scheme vs. the single-estimate scheme.
V. Robu et al. / Energy 117 (2016) 19e28 27in practice: it varies from 1.25% for predictions required an hour in
advance to 1.55% to longer term predictions, when agents are less
accurate. However, the overall conclusion is that the amount of
payment collected that is kept by the CVPP (and not redistributed)
is very small. Otherwise stated, the “cost” of assuring truthful
report s through Eq. (6) is very small, less than 2% (note that this
1.5e2% is not an actual loss, just money that accrues to the CVPP
itself, rather than the members).
5. Conclusions and further work
In this paper, we study the problem of eliciting truthful and
accurate estimates from multiple distributed energy resources
(DERs) and, at the same time, incentivise them to group to improve
their accuracy, and sell energy together as a cooperative virtual
power plant (CVPP). In order to do this, we propose a payment
mechanism (an alternative to the current feed-in tariffs), in which
producers are rewarded not only based on their production, but
also on the prediction of future output and the uncertainty of their
estimates. In order to elicit this information truthfully from
potentially self-interested agents, our proposed method uses a







Hours in advance a prediction is made
%
Percentage of the revenue received by the CVPP
from the Grid that remains undistributed to DERs
Fig. 6. Percentage of the total payment received by the CVPP from the Grid that is not
distributed to member DERs, for the different prediction scenarios.proper scoring rules. Moreover, the method we develop is generic,
in the sense that it does not make any assumptions on the distri-
bution of the error vector (such as errors following a normal
distribution).
In order to validate our method, we use a large-scale dataset
from the 16 farms of Ecotricity, a large UK renewable producer, with
outputs and predictions collected over a 10-week period. We show
that, first, the proposed payment scheme is successful in incenti-
vising agents to group and sell electricity as a CVPP. Second, the
scoring rule basedmethod outperforms a benchmark that only uses
a single-point prediction, by a factor ranging from 4% to 17% in per-
unit revenue terms, depending on the prediction horizon required.
In future work, we plan to model CVPPs formed by a combina-
tion of renewables, such as wind, solar and tidal energy, in areas
where several of these are available (this study focused on the UK,
where wind energy is the main renewable generation resource).
Furthermore, we would like to experimentally measure the finan-
cial and technological benefits to the Grid due to the better
scheduling given the increased CVPP reliability. Finally, we intend
to enlarge our settings and apply similar mechanisms to enable the
formation of cooperatives for demand response and demand-side
managementdthat is, to investigate ways in which cooperatives
of electricity consumers could form to assist the effort of achieving
demand reduction, through demand response techniques. Initial
work on applying cooperatives for collective action on the demand
sidewas started by Kota et al. [20] and by Shafie et al. [21]; however
these works do not consider the use of scoring rules to incentivise
accurate forecasts. Onework that applies a similar technique (based
on scoring rules), to the problem of demand consumption shifting,
rather than generation, is Akasiadis and Chalkiadakis [22], whose
approach was partially inspired by the conference version of our
work.Acknowledgements
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